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At a time when economists have been
accused of being imperialistic for attempting to
infiltrate other social sciences, we should not be too
surprised by attempts to incorporate other social
sciences into economics, The Lynne paper is
clearly an effort in this direction. The other two
attempt to reform or broaden the mainstream
neoclassical model.
The organizers of this session presumably
knew what they were doing in inviting me to
discuss these papers, but 1am dubious. I doubt that
it was because I have a reputation for discovering
major flaws in the neoclassical model and thus
would readily accept the arguments presented in
these papers. My Chicago training and published
work would suggest that hypothesis to be a little
far-fetched, On the other hand, I am loath to admit
that I am incapable of understanding or valuing
anything “new” or “modern. ” A final hypothesis is
that 1might be expected to enliven the meeting, and
if that is the reason I am here 1 will try not to
disappoint,
What is primarily at issue here is a
squabble over methodology, an old pastime for
economists. The crucial question is: are the models
in these papers, particularly Robison-Hansen (R-H)
and Schmid-Robison (S-R), meant to be an
extension to the neoclassical paradigm, or are they
a revolution in the Kuhnian sense of one paradigm
attempting to replace another? The Lynne paper
can hardly be considered anything other than a
revolution.
A few years ago a California colleague and
I were invited by the editor of Rural Sociology to
give our impressions of sociology as a social
science (Gardner and Nuckton 1984). We looked at
a few of the books that sociologists considered to be
mainstream. We then used Thomas Kuhn’s model
of scientific revolutions to inform our appraisal
(Kuhn 1970). Briefly, Kuhn’s view is that a science
is considered mature when it settles on a single
paradigm that transforms researchers into a
profession, The synthesis achieved by reaching a
consensus on a paradigm defines the field and
creates the mechanism by which scientific progress
can be made. Participant researchers perform what
Kuhn calls “mop-up” work--articulating the
paradigm and extending it to other areas of
experience, It is not part of the research agenda of
a mature science for members to challenge the
established paradigm, for it is the paradigm that
determines the scope of the view of the world,
identifies the crucial problems, and sets the bounds
for prescribing a better condition for the world. We
argued that the neoclassical paradigm that has ruled
economics qualified the discipline as a mature
science. Sure, the Marxists, the Austrians, and the
institutionalists have at various times proposed
alternatives to and modifications in the basic
paradigm, but their followers mostly have been
barking at the edges of the discipline campfire,
although I am sure that many would dispute that
conclusion.
By contrast, sociology even prides itself as
having several competing paradigms such as models
of order, conflict, and interactionism. The title of a
popular book by Ritzer (1975) refers to sociology as
a multiple-paradigm science; thus, if true, quali@ing
sociology as an immature science in Kuhn’s
structure.
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Now, does the broadening of the
neoclassical model, as proposed by these papers,
constitute an alternative and competing paradigm,
and thus Icaci us from a mature to an immature
scicncc, or does it simply enrich the basic
neoclassical paradigm to make it more robust? If
the former I would strongly resist this broadening,
and if the Iattcr, I would give mild support
providing that the analytical power of the paradigm
IS not lost.
The reason for my Iimitcd support IS an
empirical observation that paradigm modifications
have not been very successful in the past, [t was
primarily this same issue which arose when
Robinson’s imperfect competition, Simons’
satlsficing, Lcibenstcin’s X-inefficiency, and
Williamson’s bounded mtionality were introduced to
the profession. They all had the appeal of rejecting
certain assumptions of the competitive neoclassical
model that appeared to be inconsistent with some
behaviors of real-world actors. The problcm was
that, for the most part, all were generally incapable
of generating falsifiable hypotheses about bchawor,
and therefore, have lost ground scientifically.
Would the same be true of mcta-preferences, we-
utllity functions, and social capital? Would they
have a short period of at least partial acceptance by
many in the profession, and maybe even find their
way into some textbooks, only to bc Iatcr
abandoned as analytically sterile? In my view no
onc knows for sure.
The recognized essential core of the
neoclassical model is optimization utilizing the
assumptions of rational decision makers with stable
preferences who are active maximizers of something
such as utility, wealth, profit, or revenue. Schmid-
Robison’s (S-R’S) view of social capital as
relationships among people being an extension of
human capital In my mind, but maybe not in theirs,
places it squarely in the neoclassical fmmcwork.
The reason for any ambiguity is that their position
1s not always clear. The assumptions of the
neoclassical model appear to bc explicitly
maintained [n their rational model, and almost
throughout the R-H paper, and the positive
methodological task of developing and testing
hypotheses appears to be utilized. This is not quite
so clear, however, when the discussion turns to
firms, but to the extent that their model employs
optimizing and rationality, the scientific nature of
the methodology is in the core of economics rather
than sociology. Therefore, I would have been
happier If this had been granted up front in the
paper and the relevant literature cited to link up
with human capital theory. Instead, there is this
tendency to lash out at a neoclassical strawman
while, at the same time, to preserve and utilize its
essential core.
S-R’s social capital (Iovc, caring, sense of
community, sympathy, guilt, and hatred) resulting
from Investment is not alien to the Stigler-Becker
so-called ncw home or family economics, where the
production function of the optimizing family
includes outputs consisting of marketable and
nonmarketable commodities, and where inputs
consist of all scarce resources available to the
family, including time and productive services as
traditionally defined. However, social capital as
employed in the S-R paper is quite explicit in
specifying the kinds of relationship that are alleged
to be important, and therefore, is a useful extension
of human capital theory as traditionally understood.
The social capital models in both S-R and
R-H arc not unrelated to Becker’s altruism model so
long as they retain the assumption of rational
maximizing actors with stable preferences. It is
when S-R stray over into the area of what they call
a-rational behavior that they depart signlticantly
from neoclassical assumptions. They assert that
custom and habit may not bc rational activities.
However, Stigler and Becker (1977) accounted for
this nearly two decades ago by arguing that custom
and habit are usefully modeled as rational
phenomena. They are a means of economizing on
resources devoted to repeated search and knowledge
acquisition. The appeal of regarding them this way
is that they clearly come under the domain of
economics rather than psychology or sociology.
[ don’t think it has to bc demonstrated that
social capital as defined by S-R and R-H exists or
has a role in decisions. Perhaps our colleagues felt
they had to demonstrate as much in order to prove
the legitimacy and need ofthcir paradigm extension.
The question for me is how important is social
capital empirically, i.e., how much of actual
behavior can be explained by its use that cannot be
accounted for without it? Thought experiments in
used cars, catastrophic risks, and bank loans, rather
than actual trades where prices and opportunityJ Agr and Applied hon., July. 1995 83
costs can be assessed are not very convincing.
There may be social capital investment by students
and loan officers in giving professors and
community residents what they want to hear, as
long as the tradeoff is hypothetical and thus costs
them nothing in sacrificing real wealth. It reminds
onc of the Jordan-Twceten ( 1987) finding that most
people across a wide spectrum of demographic,
economic, social, and political characteristics are
highly approving of government programs
supporting family farms as long as they don ‘t raise
the price of food.
It is plausible that an owner of a used car
might benefit by investing in social capital by
selling the car to someone he/she likes, or why
landlords who are altruistic toward cetiain tenants
might benefit by accepting less than maximum rent.
But why should they prefer a share lease to a cash
lease to make this transfer? Is it somehow less
costly or more acceptable socially to accept a lower
share of an uncertain income stream than granting
a cash rent rebate? Surely a former farm operator,
now a landlord, could offer specialized knowledge
of the farm to benefit a tenant under a cash lease
just as well as under a share-lease arrangement. If
the tenant is in a position to degrade the land, and
it is costly to monitor his practices, the landlord
may not want to give him an inccntivc to maximize
yield which may be more Iikcly with a cash lease
than a share lease. But this is simply the traditional
explanation for share leases, and I can’t see clearly
the link with social capital.
Problems are faced by firms in a
competitive environment that may constrain their
preferences for relationships that do not exist with
consumers, If the banker is more likely to grant a
loan to someone he knows well socially, it may bc
because he likes the person because of investment
in relationships (social capital), or it may be because
his knowledge of the borrower’s character is helpful
in determining the likelihood of default. I gather
the former result supports the social capital thesis,
but the latter does not. It is asserted that the goal of
bank advertising was equally to let people know
about bank services and that the bank cares about
them. But what does “caring” really mean’? “Care”
might mean that the bank wants them as customers
to increase profits. Or it might “care” because it
has invested in social capital with customers and is
willing to transfer real resources to them in the loan
terms or in providing community services. Are both
investments in social capital? The first “caring” is
entirely consistent with normal profit-maximizing
theory, but the second appears to be inconsistent
with it. In any case, if social capital is the second
type primarily, then S-R must explain how the bank
can survive in a competitive environment in the
long run’? They would have to allege imperfect
capital markets, monopoly rents for bankers, scale
economies, or some other reason why high-cost
firms can remain competitive with lower-cost firms.
There seems to be an presumption in all
these papers that utility maximization and self-
interest or selfishness are equivalents in the
neoclassical model, and since real people are not
always selfish the model is flawed and must be
reformed. But Gary Becker, everybody’s
quintessential neoclassical imperialist, argues in his
book Treatise on the Family (198I), as well as in
other papers, that interpersonal relationships such as
family Iovc and altruism, and other opposites of
selfishness, arc arguments in the maximized utility
functions of individual decision makers who benefit
from making trades. His “rotten kid theorem” is a
vivid example of a malevolent person who benefits
from the altruism of his parents. Are there
economists these days who would deny that these
types of relationships matter in important trading
decisions? But there is nothing here that suggests
that the assumption of utility-maximizing behavior
should be abandoned analytically.
R-H also claim that the neoclassical model
can be improved by more carefully defining the
utility function. Quite possibly! They argue that in
practice the maximands are wealth, revenue, or
profit rather than utility. Indeed, this is because
these variables, often used as proxies for utility, are
observable and quantifiable magnitudes that conduce
to unambiguous analysis and prediction. I welcome
the effort of R-H to more rigorously specify and
enlarge the utility function to be maximized by
adding social capital, providing they can monetize
and quantify its contribution so as to permit
scientific hypothesis testing.
But what can we really Icarn from the
experiment with students dividing hypothetical time
to joint and individual study projects where team84 [iardner: Dmu.wion m Social Capital
members are friends, strangers, or cheats? It would
be difficult to conceal from these students that the
purpose of the experiment was to determine the
value of friendship. What person would say that
they do not prefer to work with friends, especially
if it didn’t cost them anything. Why not do a real
experiment where real resources must be sacriflccd?
Experimental economists have been doing this for a
long time. Regardless, it is not clear to me that
because people prefer friends to cheats that the
neoclassical strawman is somehow flawed’?
A question for R-H? They quote Calonius
on the importance of family businesses, at the end
of which hc points out that most don’t survive Into
the second gcnemtion. If social capital is so
important and contributes to a successful business,
why don’t families invest to assure that the family
business succeeds in perpetuity? Could it be that
investment in social capital diminishes profits and
therefore forces exit from the industry.
Let me now make a few comments on the
Lynnc paper specifically, since it most explicitly
rejects the neoclassical synthesis. Gary asserts that
“attitude” in social psychology is a C1OSCkin to
“utility” in economics. Perhaps Gary can tell us
what it would mean, even in principle, to maximize
attitude? He tells us that social norms matter. But
who would dispute that? The question is how they
matter and what is their analytical importance in
explaining individual behavior? One can try to
inco~orate them in the utility function of
optimizing and rational individuals in order to
predict their behavior, or one can attempt to predict
behavior in some other way. This dilemma may be
illustrated by Lynne’s example of whether to adopt
a soil conservation practice. Hirschman’s (and
presumably Lynne’s) way is to postulate alternative
preference functions, one reflecting only profit and
the other Hirschman’s meta-preference function.
The decision on adoption will depend on which one
wins out, to use Lynne’s words. But is this a
falsifiable hypothesis”? How can it bc without
specifying quantitatively which function yields the
greatest utility? or income? or profit? or something?
About the best one can do in Lynnc’s framework is
to argue, as he does, that if the decision ISadoption
the evidence supports the recta-preference function
and is against the profit function. But unless it is
clear that the adoption is “profitable” and is then
rcjectcd, there is no test of a profit hypothesis.
The alternative, it seems to me, is to try to
incorporate both profit and other “benefits” into a
single framework where benefits and costs are
aggregated in good old-fashioned neoclassical ways.
Then the hypothesis that adoption will occur if the
benefits excccd the costs is unambiguous and
clearly capable of falsification. If a “beneficial”
project is then rejected by the decision maker, then
it may prove useful to begin a search for missing
benefits or costs and test again.
Lynne’s parable of the strawberry grower
who is a “conservationist at heart” but chooses the
old technology because it is profit-maximizing is
illuminating. What is meant by a “conservationist
at heart” and how do wc know hc is? Because he
said so’? Lynne argues that the meta-preference was
not sufficient to override the profit preference. But
the farmer may have realized that he had no
alternative in a competitive world--he maximizes
profits and competes while claiming he is a
conservationist, or he really becomes one and exits
the industry, Economists have known about this
class of problem ever slncc the famous Machlup-
Lester controversy over whether businessmen really
usc marginal analysis in their decisions, Lester
(1946) argued that they didn’t even know how to
define marginal cost, so how could they use it? But
Machlup ( 1946) countered that they act “as if’ they
know, and that is sufficient. The assumption that
they would equate things at the margin was
therefore a useful analytical simplification. To really
know if farmers care about conservation, do you
simply ask them? They probably know what it is,
but it costs them nothing to say “yes, I care”
especially if they can cultivate good will by giving
the politically-correct answer. But predicting their
behavior is another matter. And it is far from clear
to me that even multiple regressions containing
mostly hypothetical attitude questions reveal
anything much about actual behavior where
tradeoffs must be made.
In summary, wc have before us an old
problem in the methodology of economics:
increased complexity leading to scientific sterility.
When decision makers do unprofitable things, it is
easy to allege model error and assert that there are
recta-preferences, or pleasure and moral utilities, or
different values that drive people, and end the
inquiry, You might even show that WE preferences
matter statistically. But this docsn’t get us very farJ, A,y’. flrl(l Applml .)x(>)? July, I YYJ
in testing hypotheses and making predictions. This
is why Stigler and Becker ( 1977) argued in a classic
article that “tastes are not in dispute. ” If wc find
actors doing uneconomic things, the scicntitlcally
fruitful approach for economics is to look harder for
relevant arguments in a single utility function that is
assumed to be maximized. Time and non-market
activities with their relevant “shadow prices” usually
produce the missing links. The fruitful extension of
the neoclassical economic model to analyze
problems thought to be the domain of the other
social sciences is proof of its scientific robustness.
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I close by again complimenting our
colleagues for producing three provocative papers
that have clarified for me some important issues,
such as the importmce of investing in social
relationships. Will the effort produce lasting good?
Maybe it is disciplinary inertia, maybe it is too
costly to move out of the rut of the familiar
paradigm. I guess my prediction is that for most of
us in the discipline, the effort will be evaluated as
a methodological detour that would only lead us
down a path toward scientific obscurity.
Becker, Gary S. ( 198 I) Treatise on the Family, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Gardner, B. Delworth and Carole Frank Nuckton. “Two Agricultural Economists Look at Rural
Sociology,” Rural Sot. 4 (2), March, 1984: 100-109.
Jordan, Brenda and Luther Twcctcn. “Public Pcrccptions of Farm Problems,” Research Report P-
894 (Stillwater: Agr. Exp. Sta., Division of Agriculture, Oklahoma State University, June 1987):
1-1o.
Kuhn, Thomas, ( 1970) The Structure q~’ Scientific Revolutions, (2nd cd.). Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Lester, R. A. “Shortcomings of Marginal Analysis for Wage-Employment Problems,” Amer. Econ.
Rev., March, 1946, 36, 63-82.
Machlup, F. “Marginal Analysis and Empirical Research,” ,4ner. Econ. Rev., September, 1946, 36,
519-54.
Ritzer, George. (1975) Sociology: A Multiple Paradigm, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Stigler, George J. and Gary S. Becker. “De Gustibus Non Est Disputandum,” Amer. Econ. Review,
67 (2), March, 1977:76-90.